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FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS: RE-EXAMINING
fWlOODS v. INTERSTATE REALTY CO. AND

REOPENING THE FEDERAL COURTS
WILLIAM LAURENS WALKER*

Today the federal courts are closed to out-of-state corporate plaintiffs
that have not complied with local foreign corporation laws.
Practically all state laws conditioning the admission of corporations
chartered by other states provide for the forfeiture of contracts by noncomplying foreign corporations, but for many years the federal courts
in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction offered a measure of relief from
these penalties. They applied a body of law established in opinions by
justices Holmes and Hughes that recognized the forfeiture provisions in
areas of state competence, but refused forfeitures where there were
federal interests.
In 1949 the Supreme Court radically changed its position in Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co.1 and decided to apply all foreign corporation law
forfeiture penalties in the federal courts. Ironically, the Court acted to
support a complex scheme of state regulation then losing its purposes
and principle and now without reason and sustained only by inertia.
The Woods decision is contrary to the fundamental principles of the
federal system and has become a treacherous precedent in federal-state
choice of law doctrine that now ought to be removed.
I. T39E FEDERAL COURTS CLOSED
The Interstate Realty Co. was aptly named. By its own admission
the Tennessee corporation carried on its brokerage business in Tennessee,2
Arkansas, Missouri, Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky, and Mississippi.
During 1946, commissions from the sale of land in Mississippi alone
totaled $14,430 or nearly fifteen per cent of the total commissions received by the corporation during that year.3 One commission not included
in the 1946 total was a fee of $3,450, which the corporation believed it
had earned on the sale of a parcel of land located in Panola County,
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
337 U.S. 535 (1949).
2Record at 66, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
3id. at 64.
* Associate
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Mississippi. On January 1, 1946, the Panola County property was conveyed by its owner, J. S. Woods, a resident of Mississippi, to Carl A.
McCown, but Woods refused to pay the corporation the fee it claimed
4
it had earned by bringing the parties together.
In 1947, Interstate Realty sued Woods for the fee in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. Defendant
Woods moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to comply with the Mississippi foreign corporation law. Woods'
motion did not question the sufficiency of the service of process, the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, or the venue. The Mississippi
law required foreign corporations doing business in the state to designate
agents for service of process arid required them to file copies of their
charters or articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State. The
law further provided that any foreign corporation "failing to comply
with the above provisions shall not be permitted to bring or maintain
any action or suit in any of the courts of this state."5 The motion for
summary judgment was granted.
A. The Law of Holmes and Hughes
The first foreign corporation law in the United States was enacted
in 1852, but similar laws were not widely adopted until after the 1878
decision of Pennoyer v. Neff.' By 1902, some forty states had enacted
first statutes, and most of this early legislation included forfeiture provisions.'
1. The Void-Unenforceable Distinction
The Supreme Court's first statement on the recognition due these
penalties in the federal courts came in Diamond Ghte Co. v. United States

'Id. at 8.

Law of April 13, 1928, ch. 90 [1928] Miss. Laws 133 (designation requirement
and penalty); Law of April 19, 1900, ch. 45 [1900] Miss. Laws 47 (charter filing
requirement). The statutes, as collected in the Mississippi Code of 1942, may be
conveniently found in Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 702 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1948). The Mississippi statutory scheme contained the major elements of
foreign corporation laws now found in all fifty states. See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1968).
895 U.S. 714 (1878).
'See Walker, Foreign CorporationLaws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L. REv.
1, 13-15 (1968). Forfeiture penalties continue to be popular, though their impact
has been substantially reduced by a trend toward giving retroactive effect to subsequent compliance. In at least eight states, however, losses still cannot be redeemed.
1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 292 (Supp. 1968).
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Glue Co." The plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, brought suit against a
Wisconsin corporation in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin for breach of a contract to plan, build, and manage
a factory to be located in Wisconsin. The defendant answered that the
plaintiff had neither designated a local agent nor filed a copy of its
charter and, therefore, the contract was "wholly void on its behalf."9
The circuit court overruled the plaintiff's demurrer and recognized the
defense.' ° The Supreme Court affirmed without dissent. Justice Holmes
first noted that the Wisconsin foreign corporation law "provided... that
every contract made by such corporation affecting the personal liability
thereof or relating to property within the state before compliance with
the section should be wholly void on its behalf, but should be enforceable
against it."" He then wrote that "the instrument was signed in Wisconsin, and at all events, if it was executed with a view to carrying on
of business in that State by the plaintiff, the law of Wisconsin must be
applied .... There is no controversy on this point."' 2
The Court's second statement came nine years later in David Luptoies
Sons v. Automobile Club of America."3 The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania
corporation, entered into a contract in New York by which it agreed to
manufacture and install frames and sashes for a building to be erected
in that state. A dispute developed, and the Pennsylvania corporation, insisting that it was wrongfully prevented from performing the entire
contract, brought suit in New York in the Circuit Court of the United
States. The defendant maintained that the suit should not be allowed
because the plaintiff had not complied with the New York foreign
corporation law. The New York statute required foreign corporations doing business in the state to file copies of their charters, designate their principal places of business, and appoint local agents for
service of process. The statute further provided that noncomplying
corporations shall not "maintain any action in this state upon any contract
made by it in this state."' 4 The circuit court entered judgment for the
defendant, and the plaintiff corporation appealed. The Supreme Court
reversed without dissent. Justice Hughes began by asking whether
8 187 U.S. 611 (1903).
9 Wis. STAT. § 1770b (1898) (enacted Aug. 20, 1897, but not separately printed).
1 Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 103 F. 838 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1900).
11 187 U.S. at 613.
2Id.
18225 U.S. 489 (1912).
1 Law of May 18, 1892, ch. 687, §§ 15-16 [1892] N.Y. Laws 1805-06.
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the New York statute made the contract void. He found that in Mahar
v. Harrington Villa Sites 5 the New York Court of Appeals had held
that "a contract made by a foreign corporation doing business within the
State without certificate of authority is not absolutely void; that the only
penalty prescribed by the General Corporation Law for a disregard of
the provisions of sec. 15 is a disability to sue upon such a contract in the
courts of New York."' 6 He then reasoned that since New York law did
not void the contract, the suit should be allowed in the federal court. He
wrote that New York "could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors
in the courts of the United States, and could not deprive of their privileges those who were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the
United States to resort to the Federal Courts for the enforcement of
a valid contract."'
For thirty-five years these two cases described the recognition due the
penalty provisions of state foreign corporation laws in the federal courts.
The rule was relatively clear: Where the laws make the local contracts
of noncomplying corporations void, those statutes must be applied in
federal courts. On the other hand, where the laws merely close local
courts to noncomplying corporations, the federal courts should allow
actions by noncomplying plaintiffs."8
2. Constitutional Dimensions
The determination by federal courts of the proper recognition due
state laws regulating the admission of corporations from other states is
an aspect of a more general question-what effect must a federal trial
court give to a statute of the state in which that court is located? The
primary answer to that question was given by Congress in 1789 when
it provided in the Rules of Decision Act that "[t]he laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
10204 N.Y. 231, 97 N.E. 587 (1912).
10225 U.S. at 496.
17Id. at 500.
'8 The Holmes-Hughes distinction obviously focuses on controversies involving
corporate contracts. Tort actions by corporations are relatively infrequent and have
created few if any problems involving the application of foreign corporation laws
in the federal courts. According to the Diamond Glue-Lupton's rule stated in the
text, tort actions by noncomplying corporations would presumably have been allowed
in the federal courts-statutes affecting contracts would be inappropriate and
statutes affecting jurisdiction would not have been applied.
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cases where they apply."' 19 Clarification was provided by the Supreme
Court in Swift v. Tyson, 20 which held that this Act does not oblige federal
courts to follow local state court decisions, at least as "to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to
questions of general commercial law.' 21 In Keary v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,2" the Court gave notice that federal courts were not to
follow certain state statutes by holding the Circuit Court of the United
States for Mississippi in error for applying a Mississippi statute requiring
joinder of all drawers and endorsers in an action on a promissory note.

Justice Storey wrote:
The statute of Mississippi, proprio vigore, is of no force or effect in the
Courts of the United States, it not being competent for any state legislature to regulate the forms of suits or modes of proceeding or pleadings
in the Courts of the United States; but the sole authority for this
2
purpose belongs to the Congress of the United States.
Judicial determination of which state statutes must be applied in the
federal courts continued into the twentieth century, 24 and the distinction
oJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1948)).
2Q41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
21

11d. at 19.

U.S. (16 Pet.) 89 (1842).
" Id. at 94. In Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
270 (1871), the Court held that a Wisconsin statute establishing a cause of action
for wrongful death, but providing that an action for death in the state must be
brought in the state courts need not be applied in the federal courts. In Chicot
County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893), the Supreme Court refused to apply
an Arkansas statute repealing all laws authorizing suits against counties of that
state. On the other hand, during this period the Supreme Court found a number
of state statutes properly applicable in the federal courts. E.g., Jellenik v. Huron
Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900) (Michigan statute declaring corporate stock
to be personal property); Moses v. Lawrence County Bank, 149 U.S. 298 (1893)
(Alabama statute of frauds); Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893) (Kansas
statute of limitations) ; Townsend v. Todd, 91 U.S. 452 (1875) (Connecticut recording act); Railroad Co. v. Barron, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 90 (1866) (Illinois wrongful
death act).
2 In time a now familiar distinction appeared:
2241

Section 721 of the federal statutes . . . which provides that the laws of the

several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply, has reference only to substantive law and has no application to the procedure in the federal courts.
McBride v. Neal, 214 F. 966, 969 (7th Cir. 1914). In 1928 Professor Armistead
Dobie described the Rules of Decision Act as follows:
Its primary purpose seems to be to make state statutes controlling sub-
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formulated by Justice Holmes and Justice Hughes in Diamond Glue
and David Lupton's Sons provided one of many answers developed by
the courts over the years.
Particular products of this long process can be rationally tested.
Justice Brandeis clearly emphasized in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 5 that
a federal court applying the Rules of Decision Act makes choices of
constitutional dimensions, because there is an implicit constitutional
demand that in matters of federal competence federal law be applied and
that in matters of state competence state law be applied.26 The degree of
proficiency with which this fundamental responsibility is discharged
furnishes an appropriate test for determining the correctness of those
cases deciding which state statutes must be applied by federal courts. In
Diamond Glue, the Court required application of a statute that voided
the contracts of noncomplying foreign corporations. On the other hand,
stantive rights binding on, and enforceable in, the federal courts.
Again, the statute refers to state statutes governing substantive rights; it
does not apply to state statutes of procedure.
A. DOBiE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 559-60 (1928).
A number of state statutes that fell outside the scope of the Rules of Decision
Act were nevertheless probably applied in the federal courts because of the Process
Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, which provided that "in suits at common
law" the "forms of writs and execution, except their style, and modes of process
and rates of fees . . . shall be the same in each state respectively as are now

used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same." Chief successor of the Process
Act of 1789 was the Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197, which
provided "[t]hat the practice, pleadings, and the forms and modes of proceeding
in other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts of the
United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and
forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of
record of the State within which circuit or district courts are held. . . ." Thus
a state statute held to be procedural and outside the scope of the Rules of Decision Act might nevertheless have been properly applied in the federal courts
because of this other specific Congressional directive. In an occasional case,
statutes proposed for application were found to be beyond the scope of both the
Rules of Decision Act and the Conformity Act. McBride v. Neal, 214 F. 966 (7th
Cir. 1914), was such a case. There the court held that the Conformity Act "has
nothing to do with the prosecution of the common-law writ of error which prevails
in federal appellate procedure" and that the Rules of Decision Act "has reference
only to substantive law and has no application to the procedure in the federal
courts." Id. at 969. See generally, H. M. HART & H. WEcESLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL. SYSTEm 581-89 (1953).

" 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" See Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 384-92 (1964); Hart, The Relation Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUm. L. Rtv. 489, 509-15 (1954). But see Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278
(1946).
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in David Lupton's Sons the Court held that a statute that created a
disability to sue should not be followed. In the first decision the Court
applied state contract law, which is generally if not exclusively a matter
of state competence in the federal system. 7 In the second the Court refused
to apply state law that operated to limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, which is certainly a matter of federal competence.
B. The Fifth Circuit Decision
By mid-century there was a considerable body of law indicating the
recognition due foreign corporation laws by the federal courts,2 8 and the
question presented when Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods came before the
Fifth Circuit could not have seemed an issue likely to reach the Supreme
Court. The district court had accurately stated the then controlling
principles,2 9 and Judge Lee in his opinion for the court of appeals turned
immediately to the question of whether the district judge had properly
held the contract void.20 This issue was difficult; although the statute
"Federal government contracts may appropriately be controlled by federal
common law. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). But cf.
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Bank of America v. Parnell, 352

U.S. 29 (1956).

-"E.g.,McLean v. York Oil Fields Supply Co., 138 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1943);

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kane, 117 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1941); Reconstruction

Fin. Corp. v. Barnett, 118 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1941). Other cases applying the
void-unenforceable distinction are collected in Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1171 (1941),
which states the Holmes-Hughes rule as follows:
It appears to be well settled, with respect to actions to enforce contract rights,
that whether a foreign corporation or its assignee may maintain in a
federal court an action which it could not have maintained in the state
court because of its noncompliance with the conditions of its doing business
in the state laid down in an applicable state statute or statutes depends upon
the effect of the statute or statutes in question. If by reason of its express
provisions ...

the effect of the applicable statute is to render null and void

any contract made by a foreign corporation which has not complied with its
terms, an action may not be maintained thereon in either a state or a federal
court. If, however, the effect of the statute is merely to prohibit suit on
such a contract, the fact that no action could have been maintained on the
contract in question in the courts of the state does not prevent the maintenance of a suit in a federal court sitting in the state or, it would seem, a
federal court sitting in another state.

Id. 1172.

"0The sole question which remains to be determined in this case is whether
or not under the Mississippi statute these contracts are void. There is no
question that the Mississippi Legislature has a right to say that they might
not use the Courts of the State of Mississippi to enforce them. They could
not say that the Federal Courts would not take jurisdiction ....
Record at 71, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (the district
court opinion was not published).
" "Being void, there would be no right in this Court or any other Court to
enforce them." Record at 72.
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spoke primarily in jurisdictional terms, the Mississippi Supreme Court
had on at least two occasions used language suggesting that the statute
made the contracts of noncomplying corporations void.3 The court of
appeals examined the Mississippi law thoroughly and reversed, holding
that the statute did not void the contracts of noncomplying corporations
but only denied them access to local courts.32 The decision was not
changed on rehearing when for the first time the defendant cited the
case of Angel v. Bullington.33 In a per curiam opinion, 4 the court distinguished the Angel decision as "concerned with the application of the
doctrine of res adjudicata under a North Carolina statute prohibiting a
suit for recovery on a deficiency judgment"3 5 and said that the language
in Angel referring to David Lupton's Sons "was argumentative." "We
do not consider it to have overruled the David Lupton's Sons Co. case
upon the question with which we are now concerned and with respect to
which the David Lupton's Sons Co. case expressly dealt." 3 6
"' In Quartette Music Co. v. Haygood, 108 Miss. 755, 767, 67 So. 211, 212
(1915), the court quoted with approval from Bohn v. Lowery, 77 Miss. 424, 427,
27 So. 604, 605 (1900), and said that "[e]very contract made for, or about, any
matter of thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, though the statute itself does not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts
a penalty on the defaulter, because a penalty implies a prohibition, though there are
no prohibitory words in the statute." In Newell Contracting Co. v. State Highway
Comm'n, 195 Miss. 395, 406, 15 So.2d 700, 702 (1943), the court wrote that "[w]e
are of the opinion that the court below was correct in holding that the appellant was
doing business in this state and that there had been no substantial compliance with
the statutes here involved . . .and that hence the contract sued on is void and

unenforceable."
"The court obviously regarded the question of whether the statute voided the
contract as the most important and most difficult aspect of the case. Only one
additional paragraph was necessary to explain that "the fact that a foreign
corporation may not sue in the State courts because it has not complied with the
conditions of doing business within the State does not shut the doors of the federal
court sitting in that State." Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 705
(5th Cir. 1948). Judge Lee's primary authority was David Lupton's Sons v.
Automobile Club of America. In a revealing footnote he said that case "is almost
on all fours with the one now before the Court and went up on the question of
whether the New York law (which is like the Mississippi law) made the contract
void or only uneforceable. Held: Unenforceable, hence the Federal court had jurisdiction." 168 F.2d at 705 n.5.
*'330 U.S. 183 (1947). See p. 65 infra.
Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 170 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1948).
'DId. at 695.
"' Id. A troubled future for the court of appeals decision was accurately predicted in 49 COLUm. L. Rnv. 852 (1949). The writer in 33 MINN. L. REV. 664
(1949) happily predicted that "[t]he court's preoccupation with archaic and incorrect views as to the position of federal courts in diversity cases . . .can only
result in complete revision of its decision on appeal." Id. 667. A writer from
Indiana agreed and said that "no independent judgment was intended to be allowed

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

C. Justice Douglas at the Courthouse Door
Five members of the Supreme Court voted to reverse the judgment
of the court of appeals and close the Mississippi courts to the plaintiff
Tennessee corporation. The opinion of the Court by Justice Douglas relies
heavily on Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 37 and Angel v. Bullington, but
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is the obvious center of the puzzle. Both
Guaranty Trust and Angel grew out of that case and Justice Douglas'
opinion shows clearly that five members of the Court thought that the
Woods result was demanded by the seminal case.
1. The Spirit of Erie
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins has probably provoked more law review
comment than any other case decided by the Supreme Court, and this is
not the place to reopen the story.18 It will be sufficient here to recall that
the holding in Erie did not by its own terms change the rules controlling
the application of state statutes in federal courts. Justice Brandeis clearly
recognized that "the oft challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson"' 0 allowed
the federal trial courts to ignore only the "unwritten law of the State as
declared by its highest court,"4 and, in fact, at each critical point in his
opinion contrasted the then current rules with respect to the recognition
of state statutes in federal courts with the rule allowing federal courts to
ignore state decisional law. 1
the federal court which should therefore have refused to entertain the case, precisely
as a state court would have refused." Note, Effect of State Statute on Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts, 24 IND. L.J. 418, 427 (1949).
'326 U.S. 99 (1945).
11 It should be noted that further consideration of Erie would not be time spent
on a moot question. "It is unquestionably true that up to now Erie and the cases
following it have not succeeded in articulating a workable doctrine governing choice
of law in diversity actions." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
30 304 U.S. at 69.

,0 Id. at 71.
"'Inpart one of his opinion Justice Brandeis wrote that "the purpose of the
section was merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some
federal law is controlling, the federal court exercising jurisdiction in diversity of
citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written." 304 U.S. at 72-73. In part two of his opinion he
criticized Swift v. Tyson because "[i]t made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or
in the federal court . . . ." Id. at 74-75. In part three Justice Brandeis wrote that
"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law
of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern." Id. at 78.
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Why then did five members of the Supreme Court feel compelled to
vote for reversal in the Woods case? Certainly the answer lies somewhere
beyond the actual decision in Erie.42 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the
Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in New York was required
to apply the New York statute of limitations in a diversity action for
damages for breach of trust. No proposal to apply New York decisional
law was involved, but Justice Frankfurter nevertheless designated Erie
"four starting point"4 3 and finished with his outcome determination
test for the application of Erie. He apparently believed that the Erie
case must be looked to where the application of a state statute is involved
because the error of Swift v. Tyson was so broad that the attitude of
federal courts toward the application of state statutes had been somehow
infected.44 In Angel v. Bullington Justice Frankfurter again wrote for
a five-member majority. The Court held that a Virginia plaintiff who sold
land in that state to a North Carolina resident could not sue in a federal
court in North Carolina to obtain a deficiency judgment where a North
Carolina statute prohibited deficiency judgments. The Holmes-Hughes
distinction 4 5-- developed for foreign corporation laws-had little to do
with the question of whether a statute prohibiting a deficiency judgment
should be applied in the federal courts, but Justice Frankfurter interjected
the David Lupton's Sons case by writing: "Cases like Lupton's Sons Co.
v. Automobile Club .

.

. are obsolete insofar as they are based on a view

of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins .

. . .""

Justice Frankfurter's impression that the Swift v.

" For a discussion of the Erie holding and its gloss see Meador, State Law
REV. 1082 (1963). See also H. M. HART

and the Federal JudicialPower, 49 VA. L.

& H. WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 670 (1953).
,' Our starting point must be the policy of federal jurisdiction which Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins . . . embodies. In overruling Swift v. Tyson . . . Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins did not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a
particular way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process long
after its inadequacies had been laid bare.

326 U.S. at 101.

"'Justice Frankfurter, quoting from Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S.
538, 540 (1941), said:
The matter was fairly summarized by the statement that 'During the period
when Swift v. Tyson (1842-1938) ruled the decisions of the federal courts,
its theory of their freedom in matters of general law from the authority of
state courts pervaded opinions of this Court involving even state statutes or
local law.'

326 U.S. at 102.

"'See pp. 57-59 .ipra.
11330 U.S. at 192.
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Tyson error contaminated the technique of the federal courts in applying
state statutes according to the Rules of Decision Act and his specific suggestion that the technique might be wrong where foreign corporation
statutes were involved collected five votes for reversal in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.
2. A View of Diversity
Justice Douglas believed that the issue in the Woods case was the
validity of the fundamental rule etablished by Holmes and Hughes.47 He
focused on the David Lupton's Sons case and wrote that "[i]f the Lupton's
Sons case controls, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was right in
allowing the action to be maintained in the federal courts."4 The doubt
was obviously created by the impression and suggestion of Justice Frankfurter. "We said in Angel v. Bullington that the case of Lupton's Sons
had become 'obsolete' insofar as it was 'based on a view of diversity
jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie Railroadv. Tompkins .....

",

The implied question was critical: Did David Lupton's Sons in fact
represent a "view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins"? The David Lupton's Sons case, and the
technique for applying foreign corporation laws in the federal courts that
it partially established, was thoroughly consistent with the constitutional
demands stated by Justice Brandeis in Erie, and the case did not, therefore, represent a view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end
with Erie. If the Court had considered the question and had answered
it correctly, the court of appeals' decision in Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co. would have been affirmed. But the Court either did not recognize
the issue or mistakenly assumed that Justice Frankfurter's statement was
both question and answer. Without comment Justice Douglas moved on
to apply the outcome determination test of Guaranty Trust and to reverse
the Fifth Circuit. Curiously, the result was wrong even by Justice
Douglas' own rationale that "the contrary result would create discrimina" He apparently found no fault with the Fifth Circuit's application of the

Holmes-Hughes distinction:
It [the court of appeals] reviewed the Mississippi decisions under the Mississippi statute and concluded that the contract was not void but only unenforceable in the Mississippi courts. It held in reliance on David Lupton's
Sons Co. v. Automobile Club ... that the fact that respondent could not sue
in the Mississippi courts did not close the doors of the Federal court sitting
in8 that State.
A9 Id.
4 Id. at 537.
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tions against citizens of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court." 50 Nonrecognition of foreign corporation laws can never result in discrimination "against citizens
of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts." Exactly the reverse is true because nonrecognition prevents discrimination against nonresidents by allowing
access to remedies available to residents.51

II. THE

IMPACT OF

Woods

The Woods decision has played a significant role in a large number
of cases not involving foreign corporation laws. It has, for example,
recently influenced, with generally poor results, the answers to such a
variety of questions as whether a Virginia statute of limitations should
be followed by a Kentucky federal court, 2 whether an action against a
Navajo Indian could be brought in an Arizona federal court,53 and whether
a local long-arm statute could bring a Wisconsin corporation with occasional local contacts into a North Carolina federal court." The typical
effect of Woods in tangential areas has been to encourage rigid application of state law, particularly where jurisdictional questions are involved.
30 Id. at 538.

"1The use of the outcome determination test in Woods was vigorously criticized
in Note, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950):
Perhaps the feeling that the Guaranty Trust rule has gone too far will
concretely manifest itself in a majority opinion when some case which,
because of the application of the rule, exhibits that a grotesque miscarriage of
justice would result, is presented. Then perhaps a limitation on the sanctity of archaic, discriminatory and unjust state laws-a limitation which is
becoming increasingly necessary-will be imposed upon the present rule.
Id. 423. The test was also criticized in 44 ILL. L. REv. 533 (1949), where the
writer said that "an Erie doctrine which left some room for inquiry into the
policy underlying a state's withdrawal of jurisdiction, as to whether that policy
would be subserved by a withdrawal of federal jurisdiction, would promote the
ends of justice far more than an inflexible rule of thumb." Id. 536. For other
comments, see 14 ALnANY L. Rzv. 98 (1950); 16 BROOKLYN L. Ruv. 121 (1950);
26 N.D.B. BRIEFS 306 (1950); 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 131 (1949).
"2Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 829 (1967).
"5Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
"' Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966). For other examples, see Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 985 (1966); Lewis v. Hogwood, 300 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 193 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952); Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Lindley v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 276 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd, 407 F.2d
639 (7th Cir. 1968).
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More relevant, though, to an analysis of Woods is an examination of its
consequence in cases involving foreign corporation laws.
Woods has produced some shocking losses by out-of-state corporate
plaintiffs, which probably resulted in considerable windfalls for local
defendants. In Paisley Products Inc. v. Trojan Luggage Co., 5 for example, the plaintiff foreign corporation sued the defendant Tennessee
corporation in a Tennessee federal court to recover the price of goods sold
and delivered to the defendant in Memphis. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff did not qualify to do business
in Tennessee until after the contract was made. The court held that
according to the law of Tennessee, the subsequent compliance did not
make the contract enforceable, and dismissed the suit with the halfapology: "It is our duty under Erie to follow the law as announced by
the courts of this State and not to substitute therefor our concept of the
law as we think it perhaps should be." 56 Another striking loss apparently
occurred in Hicks Body Co. v. Ward Body Works 7 where the plaintiff,

a noncomplying Indiana corporation, was not allowed to sue an Arkansas
corporation in an Arkansas federal court for the alleged breach of a
contract to manufacture twelve thousand school buses. Woods has also
resulted in schemes to establish immunity from suit. In Hulburt Oil &
Grease Co. v. Hulburt Oil & Grease Co.,5 s a Pennsylvania corporation's unhappy minority stockholders organized an Illinois corporation
under the same name and obviously expected to carry on business while
permanently protected from an unfair competition suit because the
Pennsylvania corporation could not sue in Illinois until qualified and
could not qualify because of the conflict in names. 5 But the most
" 293 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Tenn. 1968). Apparently the suit would have been
allowed under the pre-Woods law because the court held that under Tennessee law
the contracts of noncomplying corporations are unenforceable but not void. Id. at
398.
"OId. at 400.
1233 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956). Here also the action would have been allowed
before Woods. Id. at 486.
" 371 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1966).
" The scheme failed. The Seventh Circuit found no authority prohibiting the
minority's plan, but refused to play its tendered role:
We think that the Illinois courts, in keeping with their consistent adherence
to the basic equitable principles even in the absence of a specifically authorized remedy .. .would not permit the defendant to raise the statute as a
bar to the plaintiff's action.
Id. at 255. For examples of the application of foreign corporation laws by the
federal courts and dismissals for failure of compliance, see Armor Bronze & Silver
Co. v. Chittick, 221 F. Supp. 505 (D. Conn. 1963); Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales
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notable aspect of the cases is that federal trial and appellate judges avoid
the Woods decision and the result that it demands whenever possible.
A. Evasion By Law
The first federal judge to condemn Woods was Justice Jackson. In
a strong dissent to the Court's decision, he called the state statute applied
by the majority "harsh, capricious and vindictive,"" ° and pointed out
that the amount of punishment "bears no relation to the amount of wrong
done the State in failure to qualify and pay its taxes. The penalty thus
suffered does not go to the State, which sustained the injury, but results
in unjust enrichment of the debtor, who has suffered no injury from the
creditors' default in qualification."

6

1

At least one district court simply refused to follow Woods in an
identical situation presented by Emulsol Corp. v. Rubenstein & Son
Produce, Inc." There the defendant moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff foreign corporation was doing business in
Texas but had not complied with the Texas law. The court said:
It must be conceded that in Woods v. Interstate Realty Company
•.. a divided court held as argued by the defendant in the case at bar.
But, I am strongly opposed to the doctrine therein announced. The case
here is between corporations of different state domicile. The amount
in controversy, as well as such diversity of citizenship entitles entry into
the national court. It would be an unseemly surrender of sovereignty
to be ruled by state statute as to the right to
for the Federal judiciary
3
enter a national court.
No other court has been so candid, but the Fifth Circuit managed
the same result by finding an exception to the Woods rule. In Waggener
Paint Co. v. Paint Distributors,Inc., 4 Chief Judge Hutcheson recognized the Woods case, but limited its effect by holding that foreign corporation statutes "will not be construed to deal with suits on interstate transactions; and that, if they are so construed, they will not be upheld." 65 CerCo. v. Hogue, 219 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Hutterian Bretheren v. Haas,
116 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mont. 1953); 348 Bloomfield Ave. Corp. v. Montclair Mfg.
F. Supp. 1020 (D.N.J. 1950).
Co., 00
90
337 U.S. at 539.
01 Id. at 540.
111 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1953).
00Id.
at 411.
C'

228 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1955).

" Id. at 113. The court found as a fact that the transaction was in interstate
commerce. The Fifth Circuit limitation was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
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tainly the interstate-intrastate distinction is familiar in the field of foreign
corporation laws where it has been applied, often with poor results, to
judge the federal constitutional implications of state court applications of
the statutes.6 There is no reason to believe that it will lead to any satisfactory resolution of the Woods problem.
B. Evasion By Fact
Most federal courts that have avoided Woods have not made new law
but have looked at the facts of their cases and found reasons to hold that the
actions could properly be maintained. In Wilson v. Williams,"7 the
defendants argued on appeal that the plaintiff, a New Mexico corporation,
could not maintain an action in an Oklahoma federal district court
because of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Oklahoma foreign
corporation law. The plaintiff corporation owned an interest in Oklahoma leasehold estates and in drilling equipment located in that state
and was a party to a drilling and mining venture in Oklahoma, but the
court found that the plaintiff's operations did not bring it within the
scope of the statute. The court held that the defendants "failed to discharge the burden of showing that the foreign corporation had engaged
in or transacted, or was engaging in or transacting, business in Oklahoma." ' In Rock-Ola Manufacturing Corp. v. Wertz,"0 the Fourth Circuit said that Woods "put to rest all doubt as to the effect of qualification
requirements upon the jurisdiction of Federal courts in diversity cases,"1 0
but held that the plaintiff's local activities "were not sufficient to subject
the corporation to the qualification statute, and so, failure to qualify will
not bar the corporation from maintaining this suit." 7'

The same result

was reached by the Fifth Circuit in M & R Construction Co. v. National
Homes Corp."2 The court acknowledged Woods but found nothing in a
contract that the plaintiff had made with Alabama residents or in the
Alabama activities of plaintiff's field representative that required, as a
matter of law, compliance with the Alabama statute. Similarly, in Bohn
Stolz-Wicks, Inc. v. Commercial Television Serv. Co., 271 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.
1959).
" See Walker, Foreign CorporationLaws: A Current Account, 47 N.C.L. REv.
733, 747-56 (1969).
"7222 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1955).
es Id. at 697.

" 249 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1957).

10 Id. at 814.
7
-t d. at 817-18.
286 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp.,7 the Sixth Circuit held
that summary judgment for the defendant was improperly granted, though

the defendant's affidavits showed that the noncomplying plaintiff corporation maintained an office in Ohio and that its factory representative had
made calls on the defendant in that state for many years.
III.

NEW JURISPRUDENCE

The distaste for Woods was matched in time by a distaste for Guar-

anty Trust and its outcome determination rule. The difficulties caused
by that rule in the application of foreign corporation laws were duplicated
in other areas, and in time it became apparent that the dryly logical application of the decision would, if not checked, eliminate substantial parts
of the traditional role of the federal judicial system. 4 A major breakthrough came in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative,Inc.7 5 where the
Supreme Court held that a settled federal practice of assigning the
" 303 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1962). For recent evasions by district courts, see
Bunge Corp. v. St. Louis Terminal Field Warehouse Co., 295 F. Supp. 1231
(N.D. Miss. 1969); LeFebure Corp. v. LeFebure, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 617 (E.D. La.
1968); Textile Banking Co. v. Colonial Chem. Corp., 285 F. Supp. 824 (N.D.
Ga. 1967).
In a related area, the court in Power City Communications, Inc. v. Calaveras
Tel. Co., 280 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Cal. 1968), considered and rejected the suggestion that Federal Rule 17(b) can provide relief from a state door-closing
statute. The decision is noted with approval in 82 HARv. L. REv. 708 (1969).
See generally Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(b) and (c): Qualifying to Litigate
in Federal Courts, 43 NoTmu DAmE LAWYER 273 (1968). The Rule is ill fitted for
the application proposed by the plaintiff in Power City Communications.
'The most telling criticism was that of Professor Henry M. Hart. He wrote:
Thus far the Supreme Court's decisions on these matters seem to be
founded on no higher principle than that of eliminating every possible reason
for a litigant to prefer a federal to a state court. The principle having no
readily apparent stopping place, the reach of the decision is unclear. What
is more important is the triviality of the principle. The more faithfully it is
carried out the more completely the constitutional and statutory grants of
diversity jurisdiction are emptied of intelligible meaning. The principle
passes over the essential rationale of the Erie opinion-the need of recognizing the state courts as organs of coordinate authority with other branches
of the state government in the discharge of the constitutional functions of the
state-and most of the battery of considerations marshalled by Brandeis as
reasons for respecting the constitutional plan.
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489, 512
(1954). See Farinholt, Angel v. Bidlington: Twilight of Diversity Jurisdiction?,
26 N.C.L. REv. 29 (1947).
"356 U.S. 525 (1958). The plaintiff was employed in the construction of power
transmission lines and was injured while connecting a line to a new substation.
The plaintiff sued the owner of the power line, a South Carolina corporation, for
damages, alleging that the corporation's negligence resulted in his injury.
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determination of certain questions to juries should be followed in diversity
cases despite a South Carolina state practice that left resolution of the
issues to judges.
Justice Brennan recognized that the fact situation in Byrd probably
presented an occasion for the application of the outcome test but looked
beyond that rule. He wrote:
It may well be that in the instant personal-injury case the outcome
would be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is
decided by a judge or jury. Therefore, were "outcome" the only
consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal
70
court should follow the state practice.
The full content of a new federal-state choice of law technique was not
described, but a procedure was suggested. The first step is to determine
whether a proposed state rule is bound up with the state-created rights
and obligations sought to be enforced.7 7 If that is the case, the decision
apparently requires the application of the state law in question; if not,
a second question is presented: Is the particular federal policy involved
more important than the state policy proposed for application ?78 This
test is not wholly satisfactory, but its statement is a movement toward
the ideal of applying federal law in areas of federal competence and state
law in areas of state competence.
A. Explication
The Byrd decision was applied with skill in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.70 Companion wrongful death actions were brought by Illinois
plaintiffs in a South Carolina federal court against Beech Aircraft, a
Delaware corporation, and against Dixie Aviation, a South Carolina
corporation. The suits were the result of the crash in Tennessee of an
airplane manufactured by Beech in Nebraska and serviced by Dixie in
South Carolina shortly before the crash. Beech moved to dismiss on the
6

Id.at 537.
i
S"The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations,
see e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, . . .cannot in every case exact compliance
with a state rule... - not bound up with rights and obligations-which disrupts
the federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury." Id. at 537-38.
" "Thus the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of
disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering
the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court
and another way in the state court." Id. at 538.
"'349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
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ground that the action against it was barred by a South Carolina statute
which provided that an action against a foreign corporation "may be
brought in the circuit court: (1) By any resident of this State for any
cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this State when
the cause of action shall have arisen or the subject of the action shall be
situated within this State."" ° The motion was denied"1 and Beech appealed.
Judge Sobeloff first summarized the developments from Erie to Byrd
and then wrote:
The spirit of these decisions makes it appropriate for a court attempting
to resolve a federal-state conflict in a diversity case to undertake the
following analysis:
1. If the State provision, whether legislatively adopted or judicially
declared, is the substantive right or obligation at issue, it is constitutionally controlling.
2. If the state provision is a procedure intimately bound up with
the state right or obligation, it is likewise constitutionally controlling.
3. If the state procedural provision is not intimately bound up
with the right being enforced but its application would substantially
affect the outcome of litigation, the federal diversity court must
still apply it unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations.82
The parties were in agreement that the South Carolina door-closing
statute is procedural, and, since the action was based on the Tennessee
wrongful death act, the South Carolina rule was obviously not bound up
with that state-created right. The court thus reached its third postulate
and asked whether "the South Carolina rule embodies important policies
that would be frustrated by the application of a different federal jurisdictional rule and, if so, is this policy to be overridden because of a
stronger federal policy ?,83 Judge Sobeloff found the state policy difficult
to determine and after discussing several possibilities 4 concluded that the
8

S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-214 (1962). Note that the statute is not a foreign
corporation law and therefore did not present the same issue as that involved in the

Woods case.

81237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965).

349 F.2d at 63-64.
"3Id. at 64.
"' There was no indication that docket congestion was a problem in 1870 when
the statute was passed, but in any case, the court said, state docket congestion
would certainly not be made worse by keeping open the federal courts. Counsel
for Beech suggested that the statute was designed to encourage foreign corporations
to do business in South Carolina, but the court was not persuaded. Id. at 65.
'
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state's reason "for enacting its 'door-closing' statute is uncertain.""" The
court found, however, clear countervailing federal considerations. "The
most fundamental is that expressed in the constitutional extension of
subject-matter jurisdiction to the federal courts in suits between citizens
of different states."8 6 The judgment of the district court that the South
Carolina statute did not apply was affirmed. Judge Sobeloff's opinion and
its three-step test is the best guide now available for applying the standard
of Byrd.
B. Back to Holmes and Hughes
Both Justice Hughes in David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club of
America and Justice Douglas in Woods v. InterstateRealty Co. dealt with
state statutes that denied noncomplying corporations access to local
courts and made the contracts of those corporations unenforceable, according to the old distinction, but not void. In that situation foreign corporation laws never furnish or even substantially affect the substantive right
or obligation at issue in the litigation; consequently, Judge Sobeloff's
first principle would not indicate a requirement that such statutes be
applied in the federal courts. The second principle requires a determination of whether foreign corporation law court-closing penalties are bound
up with the law establishing the right or obligation sought to be enforced.
In a sense all laws are interdependent, and for this reason arguments can
be made for positive results under the second test in such a large number
of situations that, if accepted, the standard would be no guide at all. In
Byrd, the Court found that the state law was not bound up with statecreated rights and obligations because there was "nothing to suggest that
this rule was announced as an integral part of the special relationship
created by the statute,"" and Judge Sobeloff's statement of his second
principle requires that state law be followed only where it is "intimately
bound up with the state right or obligation."8 Court-closing provisions
are undoubtedly integral and intimate parts of foreign corporation laws,
but these statutes, of course, never define the claims sought to be enforced by out-of-state corporate plaintiffs. These provisions obviously
affect rights and obligations, but only in a general and indiscriminate
8

Id.

8'Id. For a discussion of the Szautay case, including speculation about its impact
on the foreign corporation law problem, see J. COUNJD, J. FRIENDENTZIAL & A.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (1968); 66 COLum. L. REv. 377 (1966).
87356 U.S. at 536 (emphasis added).
88349 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added).
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way more characteristic, in the language of Byrd, of "merely a form and
mode" than of "a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of
the rights and obligations of the parties." 8 9 Moreover, it is possible, as
was the case in Szantay, that the rights or obligations sought to be enforced
may be the products of the law of another state-yet under Woods the
penalty of the forum state would apply. The foundation of Tennessee
substantive law in Szantay was proof enough that the South Carolina
statute was not bound up with the rights asserted; the possibility of similar situations involving foreign corporation laws is a further indication
that the statutes are not, within the meaning of the second principle,
bound up with state substantive law.
Judge Sobeloff's third postulate is, therefore, critical. State foreign
corporation law court-closing penalties are not an intimate part of state
rights and obligations, but their application can substantially affect the
outcome of litigation. Consequently, federal courts must, according to
the postulate, apply the laws unless there are affirmative countervailing
federal considerations. A proper determination requires balancing the
state policies supported by the penalties and the federal interests.
1. State Policy
There are virtually no legislative histories of the fifty state foreign
corporation laws, but it is possible to describe with reasonable confidence
the original purposes of the statutes.9" By and large they were enacted
to solve problems created in the nineteenth century by a federal constitutional requirement that original legal process be served within the territorial boundaries of forum states. The development of that requirement
began in the late eighteenth century and was given national scope as an
element of due process by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff. 91 The
rule of that case made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to bring actions
in their home states against nonresident defendants. In the case of foreign
corporations, however, the principle of conditional entry offered a solution, and the states used that nineteenth-century conceptual development
to require out-of-state corporations to appoint local agents for service of
process. A secondary purpose apparently involved in a number of the
80356 U.S. at 536.
90 See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L.
REv. 1-19 (1968). Professor Alfred Hill recognized the importance of analyzing
the policies expressed in foreign corporation laws, but made no serious attempt to
state those policies. Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L.
REv. 541, 569 (1958).
0195 U.S. 714 (1878).
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original foreign corporation statutes was the desire to protect local
plaintiffs from the assertion by foreign corporations of the broad ultra
vires defense then available in federal courts. This objective is reflected
in the typical inclusion of the requirement that copies of corporate
charters be filed with local public officials.
Changes in law in the twentieth century have eliminated both the
primary and the secondary need for foreign corporation statutes. A line
of cases from McDonald v. Mabee92 to InternationalShoe Co. v. Wash-

ington9 3 ended the service of process requirement of Pennoyer and led to
the now nearly universal adoption of long-arm statutes providing for the
service of original process beyond the boundaries of forum states. Similarly, the harsh ultra vires rule of the federal courts was effectively
abolished by Erie, and a majority of the states have resolved the problem through statutes appropriately limiting the use of the defense. Doubts
have also arisen as to whether the conceptual basis of the laws, the
principle of conditional entry, should be allowed to stand in this century. 4
Occasionally a legal technique or a statutory scheme outlives its
original purpose but develops new and important functions. This has
not been the case with foreign corporation laws. The statutes have not
developed a major new purpose; in fact, in a number of their aspects,
including particularly those relating to jurisdiction to adjudicate, choice
of law, and taxation, the laws themselves have begun to cause trouble
and give promise of more. The present utility of this expanding and complex scheme of state regulation is at most minimal.95
2. Federal Policy
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the judicial
power of the United States shall extend to controversies "between Citizens
of different States," and beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
Congress has provided that the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
trial courts includes suits between citizens of different states.
9-243 U.S. 90 (1917).
o8326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"See Walker, Foreign CorporationLaws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L. REv.
24-30 (1968).
" Walker, Foreign CorporationLaws: A Current Account, 47 N.C.L. REv. 733,
734-47 (1969). But cf. 66 CoLU . L. REv. 377, 384 (1966); the tentative policy
analysis there suggested focuses only on the penalty provisions of foreign corporation laws and fails to take into account the purposes of the laws.
"The current provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). See generally D. CtnuRxE,
FEDERAL COURTS 240-300 (1968); H. M. HAT & H. WECnSLER, THE FEDERAL
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The original purpose of the jurisdictional grant was to provide out-of-

staters a haven from local prejudice and thus to encourage personal and,
particularly, commercial intercourse among the states.9 7 While persuasive
arguments can be made that in certain aspects the extent of the present diversity grant exceeds this original purpose, few situations are so squarely
within that purpose as those typically presented in cases involving the appli-

cation of foreign corporation law court-closing penalties. In most instances,
the arrangement of the parties is, in Judge Friendly's words, "the classic
case of diversity jurisdiction, the suit by an out-of-stater against a true instater,"" s and the state law proposed for application creates substantial
suspicion of prejudice because it is fashioned only for nonresidents.9 9 It
seems reasonable to say that the federal interest in cases such as David
Lupton's Sons and Woods is clearly stated by both the constitutional and
statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction and that this statement of interest
remains a purposeful one and is arguably critical in guaranteeing the
continued prosperity of the nation. In the words of Judge Sobeloff's
third principle, there are "affirmative countervailing federal considerations" where it is proposed that foreign corporation law court-closing
penalties be applied to require dismissals of actions in federal courts. 10 0
A significantly different situation faced Justice Holmes in Diamond
Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co. There the state foreign corporation
law stipulated that the contracts of a noncomplying corporation should
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 891-943 (1953) ; Frank, Historical Bases of the
Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948); Friendly,

The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928).
" Recently, the American Law Institute thoroughly examined the diversity
jurisdiction and found it still to be a necessary element of nation building. ALl
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

99-110 (1969).
08
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 1963).
""State rules which are fashioned especially for nonresidents are too likely to
bear the imprint of hometown prejudices to be entitled to willy-nilly application in
courts which should serve as bulwarks against such prejudices." Carrington, The
Modern Utility of Quasi it Ren Jurisdiction,76 HARv. L. REv. 303, 319 (1962).
. Judge Sobeloff distinguished the Woods case and Angel v. Bullington near
the end of his opinion in Szantay. He said that in Woods there was a "clear state
policy that would have been frustrated by permitting suit in a federal court-that policy being "to encourage foreign corporations doing business in Mississippi
to register." 349 F.2d at 66. Judge Sobeloff mentioned other bases for distinguishing Woods but focused on his belief that the Mississippi statute had a valid policy
basis whereas the South Carolina act proposed for application in Szantay did not.
This is a questionable conclusion and Judge Sobeloff's tangential treatment of the
Woods case should not be given undue weight.
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"be wholly void on its behalf." ' ' A legislative statement that in described
situations no contract exists is, in the terms of Judge Sobeloff's first and
second principles, arguably "the substantive right or obligation at issue"
and almost certainly "a procedure intimately bound up with the state
right or obligation" in actions by noncomplying corporations to enforce
promises.10 2
Application of the Byrd jurisprudence thus indicates that if the choice
of law issues of Diamond Glue, David Lupton's Sons, and Woods came to
the Supreme Court today for re-examination, the Court would hold that
Holmes and Hughes were right and would overrule Woods as contrary to
the fundamental principles of the federal system.
101

See p. 58 supra.

...
Beyond the choice of law question, void contract penalty provisions, of course,
raise another serious issue: Are such provisions contrary to the commerce clause
of the Constitution? This issue should be resolved differently today than it was
in the Diamond Glue case. The plaintiff there argued that the penalty was an
"interference with commerce between the states," but the Court rejected that
claim, probably with an eye to the then viable purposes of the statute supported by
the penalty. Those purposes have largely disappeared, and today a court should
sustain such an argument. See generally Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A
Current Account, 47 N.C.L. REv. 733, 747-60 (1969).

